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Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism
AJier Kosovo. By Michael J. Glennon. New York;
Hampshire, England: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. x,
239. Index. $49.95; £35.

For the past half century, the international law
regime regarding the use offorce seemed to take
as fundamental the UN Charter's flat and absolute ban on states using force, except in self-defense, against other states. NATO's 1999 bombing
campaign to stop the ethnic cleansing by the
Milosevic regime of Serbia in its province of
Kosovo put into question the viabilityofthat Charter-based system. Milosevic was directing his bloodletting against inhabitants of his own nation; no
one seriously argued that the nations of NATO
had to bomb Serbia into submission as a form of
literal self-defense. Moreover, the Security Council did not authorize the bombing campaign, and
while the campaign's proponents could attribute
this failure to crass Russian and Chinese agendas,
the absence of Security Council resolutions of
authorization even further removed the use of
force from colorable legal justification under the
Charter.
Some commentators justified this use offorce
by an expansive doctrine of humanitarian intervention, but even those approving the campaign
acknowledged the gap between such a doctrine
and the original intent of the Charter. I In Limits
of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After
Kosovo, Michael Glennon of the University of California, Davis, Law School starts byacknowledging this gap and proceeds to conduct "a critical,
I W. Michael Reisman, Kosovos Antinomies, 93 AJIL
860' (1999) ("NATO's action in Kosovo did not accord
,with the design of the United Nations Charter"); Richard
Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of Intemational
Law, 93 AJIL 847,850 (1999) (acknowledging as "coherent" the "anti-intervention argument" that "the bypassing of UN authority is seen as a devastating constitutional blow to the authority of the Organization, and
to the most basic prohibition inscribed in the internationallaw governing recourse to force").

top-down reassessment of the whole use-of-force
edifice" (p. 4). His direct and eminently readable
study goes far beyond identifying the irreconcilability of the Kosovo bombing campaign and the
Charter. Rather, Glennon effectively scoffs at what
the structure of Charter-based use-of-force law has
become, labeling it as a fifty-year doctrinal experiment that no longer works, and taking a sharp
logical axe to the many attempts at propping up
that venerable structure.
Glennon's challenge, further elaborated in his
writings since the attacks of September II, 2001,2
has major implications both for use-of-force law,
in general, and for the Cnited States' own legal
stance on the use offorce, in particular. If the central post-World War II legal structure designed to
contain the dogs of war has been undermined to
the point of crumbling, just what confines them
now? More specifically, if the Cnited States can
make its own decisions on the use of force without
constraint by Charter-based law, does anything legally restrain it other than the calculations of realpolitik?Glennon adopts the heretical approach of
following these lines of questioning to their full
limit. His direct, no-nonsense analysis succeeds in
stripping away his readers' comforting illusions
that the Charter edifice is sufficiently in tact to be
easily defended. That analysis deserves full elucidation, after which we see how the Charter-based
regime, rather than lapsing as Glennon suggests,
might be seen as continuing on in a somewhat
adapted form.
The starting point for Glennon's substantive
analysis is that the Kosovo campaign violated the
flat textual prohibition in Article 2( 4) of the Charter against "the .threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of
any state." He reviews Oscar Schachter's studies 3
" Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defellse, Inherence, and Incoherence ill Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, 25 HM\', J, LA\\' & PL'B. POL. 539 (2002); Michael
J. Glennon, Preempting Tenonsm: He Cme for Anticipatory Self-Defense, WEEKLYSTANDARD,j.-IS, 28. 2002, at 24.
~ OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTER:>;A TlONAL L-\\\'I:>;THEORY
AND PRACTICE 128-29 (1991).
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of the Charter's travaux preparatoires-in which
Schachter found no exception to the prohibition
against nondefensive force, in general, and certainly none for humanitarian intervention, such
as in the Kosovo campaign. Moreover, Glennon
shreds (as having "scant support") the argument
of some commentators' that, by a backhanded
method, the Security Council "authorized NATO
to use force against Yugoslavia" (p. 32).
Glennon rejects the argumen ts set forth in Humanilamln lnteroention (particularly its second, 1997
edition) by Fernando Teson, who used examples of
state practice to contend that humanitarian interven tion was consonan t wi th the Charter.:; Glen non
debates Teson over such central examples as the
1971 intervention in West Pakistan (later Bangladesh), the 1979 intervention in Uganda, the 1979
intervention in the Central African Republic, and
the United States' 1983 intervention in Grenada.
Each, Glennon argues, has problems as a precedent, with respect both to the intervening states'
nonhumanitarian motives and the reluctance of
responsible officials to cite humanitarian intervention as ajustification.
Glennon's challenge to the Charter's use-offorce regime continues with his argument that it
has failed, in practice, to achieve its goal. Citing
a study of sixty-five international conflicts that produced a total of eleven million deaths between
1945 and 1996, he rejects the theories of Louis
Henkin, Thomas Franck, and others that the often pacific contemporary interactions of states
are a reflection of a viable, Charter-based legal
regime." It is illusory, he argues, to try to fit
within the obsolete categories of Charter-based
law the extent and diversity of either the use or
nonuse of force. The Charter has simply lost its
relevance, as (in Glennon'sjudgment) the Kosovo intervention makes readily apparent.
In an even more controversial position, Glennon
challenges the legal justifications for the Security
Council's authorizations to use force to deal with
intrastate violence. In this context, he surveys
authorizations "beginning with Southern Rhodesia
• "[Tlhe United States is notamiss in claiming some
measure of legitimacy from Security Council resolutions .... " Ruth M. Wedgwood, Nato's Campaign in
Yugoslavia, 93 AJIL 828,829 (1999).
, Seealso SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD
ORDER (1996).
,; See, e.g., LOUlSHENKlN,HOWNATlONSBEHAVE:LAW
AND FOREIGN POLlCY (2d cd. 1979); Thomas M. Franck,
LessonsofKosovo, 93A:lIL857, 85!J (1999) (commenting
on Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism: '['he
Searrhfor a Just Intemationlli Law, FOREIGN AFF., Mayl
June 1999, at 2).
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and continuing with legally questionable interventions in South Africa, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda,
and Haiti" (p. 114). It is not that Glennon disputes
the morality or, in most instances, even the wisdom ofthe interventions. He shares the common
horror at "stomach-wrenching atrocities" (p. 141)
such as the "mass slaughter of the Tutsi population" in Rwanda, where "the dead numbered
500,000 to one million" (p. 119). But he fI::iects
the conflation of the consenslls against genocide
with the legal issue of how, in view of the authorized interventions, Article 2(7) 's principle of nonintervention "within the domestic jurisdiction"
could still be deemed to be honored-other
than in the breach. 7
Glennon acknowledges that the bloodiest problem of violence today occurs not between organized
states, but at less organized levels, ranging from
ethnic warfare within failed nations, to terrorism.
And he acknowledges the emerging pattern of response by regional organizations and alliances,
acting usually (though not always, as in the case
of Kosovo) under some degree of Security Council authorization, as in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and the former Soviet Union. While recognizing that there is some merit to this "adaptivist"
approach (p. 123)-an important concession-he
nevertheless sees in it a breakdown of the Charter-based regime because the Security Council, a
"creature" of its Charter (p. 126), has been intervening in ways that its creators (that is, states)
"would never have agreed to" (p. 135).
In place of what Glennon sees as a defunct
Charter-based regime, he does envision the "eventual establishment of a tme legalist system to govern
use of force" (p. 11). In his judgment, however,
that time is decades away, for he sketches vividly
an assertedly unbridgeable clash of viewpoints:
between the West as supporter of the use offorce
when necessary, and Russia and China, which
fear it; and also between developed nations, which
generally might employ humanitarian intervention as a means of bringing order to a chaotic
Third World, and undeveloped nations, which
view such intervention as smacking of colonialism.
7 Various scholars have presented strong arguments
that the contemporary meaning of "domesticjurisdiction" must and should reflect the evolution of inte rnationallaw since the time of the Charter. \Nhile Glennon
respects these arguments, he argues against them on several levels, ranging from an adamantine emphasis on
original intent to the unsoundness of an evolving interpretation of the Charter on this particular matter. "The
limits explicitly imposed by Article 2(7) ... constitute
express proscriptions. To argue for power to override
express proscriptions is, in a very real way, to argue
against the rule oflaw" (p. 128).
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Until a new "legalist system" emerges, Glennon
credits in practice "the same solution had in
Kosovo: Humanitarian intervention by preexisting
regional coalitions of democracies" (p. 198), but
he does not consider such intervention to be
pursuant to a regime of international law based
on the Charter (except, in effect, in name only).
Thus, a~ he comments on the Kosovo campaign:
"Clearly the Charter was breached, but international
law? Using international law's traditional methods, no one can say" (pp. 180-81).
In newer writings published in the wake of the
September 200] attacks-and while the Bush administration audibly contemplated scenarios in
which the use of U.S. force helps topple Saddam
Hussein in order to preempt the Iraqi threat of
using weapons of ma~s destruction-Glennon has
argued that the UN Charter's proscription of preemptive force can no longer be interpreted, within
a contemporary context, as barring such preemptive actions." He therefore asks both commentators and officials today "to make way for the new
without remaining wedded to the old" (p. 205).
That is, he urges the development of a new internationallaw on the use of force-law based on
what states do now and would agree to do in the
future, not on an outmoded, Charter-based doctrinal structure based on a superseded vision of
the world from half a century ago.
Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power presents its
arresting thesis elegantly and concisely. Glennon
deploys a varied array of legal tools witll relentless
intellectual honesty. He coolly and objectively credits foreign legal assessments as often being more
valid than U.S. ones. He bluntly declares, "There
is no question that Russia and China were correct
in arguing iliat NATO's bombing violated the Charter" (p. 29). He reminds us iliat when told by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook that the lawyers
were having difficulty coming up wiili justifications
for the Kosovo intervention under the Charterbased system, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
responded, "Get new lawyers" (p. 178). Glennon
embeds his legal analysis in the history of intern ational relations and the sociology of cultural differences about force. The tone is conversational,
and the pace is brisk. Readers seeking a more abstrusely technical treatment can follow, if they
choose, the ample footnotes to studies on subjects
ranging from the classical Roman doctrine of desuetude, to Web sites on contemporary legal
theory.
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Not many readers will take issue specificallvwith
Glennon's core point: the absence of a smooth
legalistic fit between the Kosovo campaign and the
UN Charter. In the judgment of this reviewer,
however, there is a danger of allowing a hard case
(Kosovo) to make bad law-or, in this instance,
to nullify a whole body of good law. The Charter
marked an enormous and beneficial development
beyond the open-ended customary law of war of
an earlier era, which allowed some states to view
as lawful the "usc offorce to assert legal rights, to
settle disputes."!' Force is still sometimes used to
resolve disputed territorial claims-from Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, to Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands, to Iraq's ill-fated
invasions of Iran in 1980 and of Kuwait in 1990.
But the Charter regime seems effectively to have
delegitimated such irredentist acts, very few of
which have succeeded in the long run. "In reality,
the rules of the game ha,'e changed dramatically
in the last half-centun·. The liberty to venture into
war, and generally to employ inter-State force, is
obsolete."I"
Glennon is correct that contemporary state
practice hardl~' fits neatly into the Charter's original intent. Still, in both the General Assemblv
and the Security Council, discourses about th~
use offorce within the framework of the Charter
have proceeded over the past half century with
some value. The Third \\'orld has articulated its
expanded exceptions to the Charter in order to
permit assistance in conflicts of national liberation,just as the United States has articulated its
own preferred expanded exceptions in order to
permit reprisals against telTorism (for example, Libya in 1986, and Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998),
and also to ad"ance other security interests (Panama, Iraq, and Haiti just in the last dozen years).
The resulting legal structure has some of the flaws
iliat Glennon identifies, but few seem to want a reversion to what, before the Charter, appeared in
practice to have sunk \'irtuall\' to the law of the
jungle.
.
One possible problem with Glennon's analysis
is that there may be more potential than he' acknowledges for de\'eloping a sound legal system
for collective security, il1\'oh'ing roles for both the
Security Council and the regional organizations,
by evolution from the original institutions and

!I

IAN BRO\\,:>;UE, INTER:>;ATIONAL LA\\' AND THE liSE

or FORCE BY STATES 250 (1963).
H

See sulJm sources cited note 2.

10 YORAM OINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-OEn:NSE 93 (2d ed. 1994).
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concepts in the Charter-based system. I I By creating the Security Council and recognizing a role
for regional collective-security organizations, the
Charter launched something that amounts to
more-legally-than a spot con tr<lct between states.
The Security Council and regional organizations,
as international institutions established with considerably open-ended expecw.tions, contribute to
the evolution of law and deIive credibility in their
collective-security role not just from states' original consent to the Charter iL~elf, but also from
states' continuing participation and support.l~
Accepting, as Glennon suggesLs, that international
law founded upon the Charter sometimes seems
these days almost as much patch as fabric, it is
nonetheless true that patching by institutionalized processes that have independent legitimacy,
as well as their original foundation in the Charter, amounts to something more than the lapse
and desuetude of the Charter system.
The animosity of Russia and China toward the
NATO campaign in Kosovo has given way, since
September II, to at least a temporarily renewed
recognition of common security interests among
the great powers. Suppose that this concern about
secUIitycontinues and that severe problems, whether potential or actual, stimulate further development of the international regime on the use of
force. For example, suppose that the collapse of
other states or the actions of in te rn ally genocidal
regimes threaten to bring whole populations to
the fate of Rwanda; or that peaceful national governments suffer replacement by ones with aggressive and destabilizing intentions, as in the former
Yugoslavia; or that governments with hostile, aggressive attitudes like those of Iraq show evident
capability and intent to unleash weapons of mass
destrnction. Under such circumstances, the international community may well shift its views toII See, e.g., CHRISTI:-IEGRAY,INTERNATIONALL\\\'A:-ID
THE USE OF FORCE (2000).
I" See e.g., John Quigley, Tile United Nations Serurity
COllnfil: Promethean Protertor or HeljJless Hostage? 35 TEX.
INT'LL..J. 129 (2000); Sean D. Murphy, TheSerunty Council, Legitimacy, lind the Cona'!)t ojCollertilieSerunty After the
Cold War, 32 COLU~I.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 201 (1994). Events
and politics of the last decade (as with the 1994 Somalia intervcntion) have reduced the Icgitimacyaccorded
domestically in the United States to the usc of force
having only Security Council approval, but have increased such legitimacy when NATO has also given iL~
approval. Charles Tiefer, AdjllstingS01lereignty: Con temporm)' Congressional-Ewelltilll' COlltrollasies Abollt Intematiollal Orgrllli:atiol/S, 35 TEX. I;\T'L L..J. 239, 254-57
(~WOO); Charles Tiefer, War/)l'cisio1lS in the Latl'I990s 1'1'
Partial Cmlg'ressiullf/I Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. f,
14-15 (1999).
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ward approval of more interventionist and preemptive approaches to the use of force than the
Charter initially envisaged a half century ago. The
overpowering suspicion among weaker states regarding the actions of stronger ones-a suspicion
that underlay the Charter's narrow view of lC!~it
imate use offorce-would yield to an acceptance
of regionally organized intervention, under the
approval of the Security Council, as more legitimate than any alternative.
Recurrent patterns oflegally respectable use of
force would gradually lead to ac!iustments in the
rules of the past without the clear-cut demise of
the Charter-ba~ed system. I:1 Rather, over time, the
adaptation of the existing system would maintain
the inherited set of Charter-based institutions as
still the best available basis for world discourse
about the legitimate use offorce. Even the substantive rules regarding the occasions for use of force
would still be recognizable, albeit perhaps in an
evolved form. Force would continue to be illegal
when used without broad multilateral international authorization (generally from the Security
Council, though sometimes, as in Kosovo, from
other sources), or when used for other than essentially defensive and order-promoting purposes to
counter threats to the peace. The shift would be
in the definition of what constitutes a threat to
international peace and secuIity. These threatswhich would provide the basis for collective decisions on the use of force-would increasingly
be recognized to include both the internal bloodletting that generates regionally destabilizing refugee streams or ethnic tensions, as Serbia's actions did, and the development of weapons of
mass destruction by states with demonstrated aggressive tendencies, as in the case of Iraq. The
Charter's oIiginal, narrow notion ofwhatconstituted a threat to the peace would thereby be broadened, as Glennon ably demonstrates, but the use of
force would still be confined to essentially orderpromoting and hence secuIity-preserving purposes,
and would not extend to humanitarian purposes
as such. Meanwhile, the great advance made and
codified by the Charter-de legitimating the use
offorce for state selt:aggrandizemen t, for the resolution of disputes having no collective-security
element, and for other purposes unrelated to
1:\ Other commentators who have recently pursued a
similar line of analysis include, in these pages, Jonathan
Charnev in his 1999 editorial on the Kosovo intervention. S,,;'Jonathan I. Charney, NATO's KoslJTJO Intl'll/ention: Anticipatury Humanitarian Inteml'lItion in KOSOTJo, 93
AlII. 834, 838-39 (1999).
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threaL~ to international order-would continue,
as modified, to be respected.
The rest of the world would hetter tolerate the
actions of Western stales, and of the United States
in particular, if those states strelched, hut acknowledged, the existing system of the use of force in
this way rather than simply acting as if there were
no legal conslraint~ at all on the use of their weaponry. It is one thing f(lr the United States, as in
the Kosovo campaign, to transgress the Charter's
original rules-as Glennon usefully clarifies lhat
it did-while at the same lime also relying upon
other multilateral sources oflegitimacy. It is quite
another thing for the United States to claim freedom from well-estahlished standards when taking
military actions solely because it deems them to
be in it~ own self-interest.
Whatever may he the potential for such an adaptive and evolutionary path, Umil.l of Law illuminates the powerful contradictions in today's law
on the use of force, and engages its readers in
tough-minded analysis of the import of those
contradictions. Has the world drifted so far from
the UN Charter of 1945 that the old rules continue only as figment~ of diplomatic douhle-talk?
Do the de facto practices today depart so much
li'om the norms as to render Charter-reading legal advisers the priesthood of a defunct cult?
Glennon's analysis may well come to he seen as
one that disclosed the necessity of substantial replacement-at least for large components of the
original Charter-based regime regulating the use
of force, if not for the regime's whole set of institutions and principles. By the same token, his
analysis has prepared the way intellectually for the
reoriented legal regime that must eventually
emerge-by one process or another-to handle
the changing problems and perils of collective
security.

CHARLES TIEFER

University of Baltimore School of Law

Law and War: An American Story. By Peter H.
Maguire. New York: Columbia University Press,
2000. Pp. xii, 42l. Index. $30.

The destruction of the World Trade Center,
President George W. Bush has repeatedly declared,
constituted an attack not only on the United States,
but on all states and peoples. It was not, therefore, simply the equivalent of an act of war; it was
a crime against civilization. What follows, the
president has further affirmed, is that all states
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should support the efforts of the L"nited States to
hunt down and punish the perpetrators; for in so
exerting itself, America is acting on behalf of the
international community, as well as it~ own national interest. In brief, the president sees the United
States acting in this instance as enforcer of the
global order's basic norms and as executor of raison d'etat. By the same token, in pursuance of the
national and the human interest-that is, in makin!{ war on terrorism-the president sees the
L"nited States adherin!{ to the letter and spirit of
the laws gm'erning the initi'ation and conduct of
\\"ar, thereby distinguishing it~elffr{Jm iL~ enemies.
As Peter \-laguire demonstrates in his well-timed
book, Lml' IlIld Hrn; this most recent effort to surrOllnd L' .S. war making "'ith an aura of legality
has a long and decidedlv problematic pedigree.
For most of American histon', he argues, this emphasis on le!{ali ty distinguished the L" nited States
from the leading European states, which insisted
un visualizing \\'ar as an incident ofso\'ereignty, or
in Clausewitzian terms, a~ the continuation of politics hy other means-means that ha\'e no natural
limits. For \laguire, the exemplar of the worldly
European perspectil'e was the Second German
Reich hefore it~ extinction in the coml.1lsi\"e aftermath of World War I.
German and American perspecti\'es first clashed
nakedly at the 1898-99 Hague Conference, convened at the instance of that determined autocrat,
Czar Nicholas II, to promote peace. The Germans
and other Europeans pn)l"ed willing to endorse
rules-on subjects such as flags of truce, the treatment of prisoners, and armistice-designed to
mitigate gratuitous suffering in the e\'ent of war.
But "American statesmen wanted to go further
... [and] reform statecraft it~elf"1 by securing
agreement on compulsory recourse to arbitration
-in the event that interstate disputes could not be
resolved by diplomacy. Exemplifying the American elite's imagination of itself and of what distinguished the United States from the great powers of
Europe, Joseph Choate. the chief L" .S. representative at the conference, spoke of war as "an anachronism, like dueling or slayery, something that
international society had simply outgrOlm" (p. 49).
Although the U.S. proposal "'ould ha\'e encompassed only those "differences" that were "not of
a character compelling or justifying war," it was
still too much for the Gelmans, who belie\'ed that
"treaties to limit arms and provide for 'neutral"
arbitration of disputes negated [Germany's] most
I CALVI:>; DEAR~16:>;o DA\'IS. THE l::>;ITED STATES.-\:>;O
THE SECOND H-\GL:E PEACE CO:>;FERE:>;CE 15- I 6 (1975)

(quoted in Law and lVarat p. 48).

